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Control patterns in contracting-out relationships:  
it matters what you do, not who you are1  
 
Abstract 
The contracting-out of public services has often been accompanied by a strong academic 
focus on the emergence of new governance forms, and a general neglect of the processes 
and practices through which contracted-out services are controlled and monitored. To fill 
this gap, we draw on contracting-out and inter-organizational control literatures to explore 
the adoption of control mechanisms for public service provision at the municipal level and 
the variables that can explain their choice. Our results, based on a survey of Italian 
municipalities, show that in the presence of contracting-out, market-, hierarchy- and trust-
based controls display different intensities, can co-exist and are explained by different 
variables. Service characteristics are more effective in explaining market- and hierarchy-
based controls than relationship characteristics. Trust-based controls are the most 
widespread, but cannot be explained by the variables traditionally identified in contracting-
out and inter-organizational control studies.  
 
Keywords: contracting-out, municipalities, control, public services. 
  
1 The authors are listed in alphabetical order. They wish to thank Noel Hyndman and the anonymous reviewers for their 
insightful suggestions on former drafts of the paper and the editor for his support. The paper is the result of a research 
project funded by the ‘Demattè’ Research Division of SDA Bocconi School of Management. The research assistance of 
Andrea Orlandi and Silvia Rota are gratefully acknowledged. 
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Introduction 
Over the last decades, governments have increasingly moved from the direct provision of 
services to contracting them out (Brown and Potoski 2003; Van Slyke 2003; Bovaird 2006; 
Brown et al. 2006), giving rise to the emergence of new governance forms where public 
and private actors and interests interact (Miller et al. 2008; Beriv and Rhodes 2003). This 
requires the development of new systems to manage the contracting process, from the 
assessment of its feasibility, to its implementation, to its monitoring and evaluation 
(Johnston and Romzek 1999; Romzek and Johnston 2002; Brown and Potoski 2003; Van 
Slyke 2007).  
Much literature has focused on the identification of the most efficient governance forms to 
provide the service (the first stage of the contracting process) (Johnston and Romzek 1999; 
Brown and Potoski 2003; Bel and Warner 2008; Hefetz and Warner 2012). In the light of 
the interest in contracting-out issues shown by many scholars, it is perhaps surprising that 
the phases of monitoring and evaluation of contracted-out public services have rarely been 
investigated (Miller et al. 2008). This neglect often reflects the limited attention towards the 
phase of contract evaluation (Kettl 1993; Brown and Brudney 1998; Sclar 2000), which 
sometimes translates into a deficit of monitoring and, in general, contract management 
capacity (Brown and Potoski 2003; Van Slyke 2007). Consequently, calls have been made 
to better understand such monitoring practices in view of their importance in ensuring the 
effectiveness of contracting-out (Johnston and Romzek 1999; Romzek and Johnston 2002; 
Cristofoli et al.  2010).  
This paper combines contracting-out (Donahue 1989; Hefetz and Warner 2012; Marvel and 
Marvel 2007; Van Slyke 2007) and the inter-organizational control (Van der Meer-Kooistra 
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and Vosselman 2000; Langfield-Smith and Smith 2003; Caglio and Ditillo 2008a, 2008b) 
literatures to explore variables relating to the adoption of control mechanisms for public 
service provision at the municipal level. The contribution is twofold. First, by combining 
the traditional contracting-out and the inter-organizational control literatures, we explore 
whether the variables traditionally used to explain contracting-out choices have explanatory 
potential. Second, differently from previous studies, we consider both the intensity and the 
types of control (i.e. hierarchical, market-based and trust-based). The analysis is based on a 
survey of Italian municipalities, where public services have been increasingly contracted 
out, requiring the deployment of a combination of controls over the public-service 
providers.  The paper is structured as follows: the next section reviews the relevant 
literature on monitoring and control systems in public service provision; this is followed by 
a discussion of types of control and possible explanatory variables regarding choice of 
control method (as a basis for developing two propositions); subsequent sections outline the 
research methods, the results and a discussion of the results; and the final section draws 
conclusions and suggests further research avenues. 
 
Monitoring and control systems in public-service provision 
The contracting-out literature has mainly focused on outsourcing forms and their 
determinants (Brown and Potoski 2003; Van Slyke 2003; Bel and Warner 2008; Hefetz and 
Warner 2012; Albalate et al., 2013). Contracting-out behaviors have been studied looking 
at service-delivery choices and consequences, often adopting a transaction-cost approach 
and proposing explanatory variables, such as asset specificity, output measurability, task 
uncertainty and task interdependence (Ferris and Graddy 1991; Milward and Provan 2000; 
  - 5 -
Brown and Potoski 2003; Malatesta and Smith, 2014). In a comprehensive analysis of 
contracting-out, Hefetz and Warner (2012) find that the most important factors explaining 
delivery mode choices (in-house, delivery by government, by for-profit or non-profit 
entities) are the extent of market competition, citizen involvement and the place 
characteristics.  
Only a few studies, drawing mainly on economic theories, such as transaction-cost 
economics  (Williamson 1981) and agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1996), have 
focused on the monitoring of public services in contracting-out contexts. According to 
these, monitoring systems are put in place in order to minimize transaction costs and goal 
misalignment between principal and agent. However, Van Slyke (2007) finds that the 
degree of variance in the level of monitoring is much lower than expected, and he suggests 
that both agency theory and rational management theory (related to goal congruence issues) 
have strong explanatory limitations. He also argues that the explanation of different 
monitoring devices in different public services may necessitate the adoption of alternative 
theoretical perspectives. Contrary findings are presented by Marvel and Marvel (2007), 
who investigate the intensity of monitoring mechanisms contrasting transaction-cost and 
performance-measurement literatures. They find that, consistently with literature 
expectations, the delivery mode (in-house, delivery by government, by for-profit or non-
profit entities) can actually affect the intensity of the controls put in place as a consequence 
of the divergence in the provider’s goals. Their study shows that the intensity of ex-ante 
process and ex-post monitoring does not differ between in-house and for-profit provision. 
Furthermore, Marvel and Marvel (2008) also suggest that intrinsic service characteristics, 
such as asset specificity and ease of measurement, may also contribute in determining the 
intensity of controls. Services which generate more monitoring, indeed, do so 
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independently of the type of delivery mode. Finally, Brown and Potoski (2003) point out 
that governments that contract out tend to calibrate their monitoring on the basis of the 
transaction-cost risks attributable to a certain service and to the contracting environment.  
The above contributions only consider the intensity of controls in contracted-out public 
services. More recently, Cristofoli et al. (2011) have gone further, looking at the types of 
controls (i.e. market-, hierarchy and trust-based) put in place and widening the range of 
variables and characteristics that can explain them. Control patterns tend to combine and, 
while environmental (uncertainty and asset specificity) and task ( output measurability and 
task programmability) characteristics only partially explain the adoption of certain control 
configurations, control mechanisms seem to be influenced by party characteristics (partner 
knowledge, ownership configuration and political visibility). However, their limited study 
(of nine cases) did not consider variables such as delivery mode, political orientation, and 
financial performance.  
Bringing together the inter-organizational control and the contracting-out literatures (so far 
used separately), this paper aims at providing a more comprehensive view of the 
monitoring and control mechanisms of contracted-out public services. In particular, we 
contribute to this (very limited) literature by: exploring, through a survey, whether the 
variables used to explain contracting-out choices have explanatory potential (particularly  
with reference to the subsequent control mechanisms established); and considering the 
impact of different types of controls (i.e. hierarchical, market-based or trust-based). 
 
Types of control and explanatory variables 
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The literature on control mechanisms has traditionally identified three ideal-types: market-, 
hierarchy- and trust-based controls (Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman 2000; 
Langfield-Smith and Smith 2003; Håkansson and Lind 2004). This literature defines 
market-based patterns of control as those where the information necessary to regulate 
transactions is included in the price, linked to standardized activities and outputs (Caglio 
and Ditillo 2008a), competitive bidding takes place at periodic intervals and contracts are 
characterized by a low level of detail (Langfield-Smith and Smith 2003). Hierarchy-based 
patterns of control are those based on behavioural controls, where detailed contracts should 
be used to monitor the performance, and control mechanisms include specified norms, 
standards, detailed rules and rigid performance targets. The aim of these controls is to 
guarantee continuous supervision, performance measurement and evaluation (van der 
Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman 2000; Langfield-Smith and Smith 2003). Finally, trust-
based patterns are generally described as substitutes or complements for formal control 
mechanisms (Dekker 2004; Das and Teng 1998), based on social controls, broad non-
specific contracts and emergent performance assessment standards, personal consultation 
and intensive communication to generate confidence that the other parties will not behave 
opportunistically (Langfield-Smith and Smith 2003).  
It has to be noted that these three control types represent extremes on a spectrum, and we 
might expect that, in reality, different combinations of these forms exist (Caglio and Ditillo 
2008a; Spekle 2001). Moreover, as suggested by previous literature (Spekle 2001; Caglio 
and Ditillo 2008a; Miller et al. 2008), it is worth remembering that the concept of 
governance form or structure is different from  the concept of control. Indeed, within the 
same mode of governance a variety of different control models is possible (Spekle 2001).  
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Both the inter-organizational control and contracting-out literatures have traditionally relied 
on transaction-cost economics, identifying variables such as output measurability, task 
uncertainty and asset specificity as explanatory factors for control choices and contracting-
out decisions (Brown and Potoski 2003; Van Slyke 2003; Romzek and Johnston 2002; Bel 
and Warner 2008). However, other variables might aid explanation, as Hefetz and Warner 
(2012) show for contracting-out, and Cristofoli et al. (2011) suggest for control decisions. 
Drawing on previous studies, two main sets of variables can be identified: service and 
relationship characteristics. Their features and expected effects are discussed in the next 
sub-sections.  
 
Explanatory variables: Service characteristics  
Existing inter-organizational control literature mainly refers to service characteristics in 
terms of asset specificity, task uncertainty, task interdependence and output measurability 
(Ferris and Graddy 1991; Milward and Provan 2000; Brown and Potoski 2003; Marvel and 
Marvel 2008; Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman 2000; Langfield-Smith and Smith 
2003). Services characterized by low asset specificity and task interdependence, and high 
output measurability, are expected to be associated with market-based types of controls. 
When the final service output is less predictable and less commodified (the level of task 
uncertainty ranges from medium to high), and services are characterized by moderate asset 
specificity, task interdependence and output measurability, hierarchy-based patterns seem 
to be more suitable (van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman 2000; Langfield-Smith and 
Smith 2003; Caglio and Ditillo 2008a, 2008b). Finally, trust-based patterns are expected to 
be associated with tasks characterized with high levels of uncertainty, together with high 
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asset specificity and task interdependence, and low output measurability (Van der Meer-
Kooistra and Vosselman 2000; Langfield-Smith and Smith 2003; Håkansson and Lind 
2004).  
In the light of the above considerations, the following proposition can be developed:  
Proposition 1: In contracting-out relationships concerning the provision of public services, 
the type of controls (i.e. market-, hierarchy- and trust-based) put in place will be associated 
with different configurations of service characteristics (namely, asset specificity, task 
interdependence, uncertainty and output measurability).  
 
The identified relationships and their expected signs are summarised in Table 1. 
 
Explanatory variables: Relationship characteristics 
The characteristics of the relationship (such as mode of delivery/goal congruence, political 
visibility and partner knowledge) between the parties involved in the public-service 
provision may be relevant not only in explaining contracting-out choices, but also in 
defining the types of controls subsequently set in place.  
Previous contracting-out literature has identified the nature of the service provider (for-
profit, non-profit, public) as a possible explanatory factor of the intensity of controls 
(Marvel and Marvel 2007, 2008; Van Slyke 2007). This variable has been alternatively 
called delivery mode (Marvel and Marvel 2007, 2008) or goal congruence (Van Slyke 
2007; Provan and Milward 1995). These studies show that the controls put in place tend to 
have different intensities, with, in particular, much tighter controls used with for-profit 
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providers, while public and non-profit providers show more aligned goals and behaviours 
(Marvel and Marvel 2007, 2008). We thus expect governmental and non-profit providers to 
be subject to lower levels of control than private for-profit companies. Similarly, high 
degrees of alignment between the public sector’s and the provider’s objectives (i.e. goal 
congruence) should result in less intense controls. At this stage, however, there is no 
definite evidence indicating the type of association between this variable and the type of 
controls, which calls for further investigation.  
Looking at the few inter-organizational control studies on the topic, Cristofoli et al. (2010) 
suggest that high political visibility and high partner knowledge help explain a predominant 
bureaucratic model with a trust-based flavour. On the contrary, when political visibility and 
partner knowledge are low, bureaucratic models seem to be complemented by market-based 
mechanisms. The relationship between citizens and government is crucial since politicians 
are particularly sensitive to the general public’s evaluation and potential criticism (Lioukas 
et al. 1993; Cristofoli et al. 2010). The attention paid by political bodies to certain services 
can explain the emphasis on developing more or less formal communication, frequent 
meetings and daily contacts. Literature has also shown that higher political visibility is 
associated with stronger intensity of controls (Lioukas et al. 1993). Finally, a few studies 
suggest that higher knowledge of the partner can result in either a reduced need for formal 
coordination or improved coordination (Dekker 2004; Cristofoli et al 2010).  
From the above considerations, a second proposition follows: 
Proposition 2: In contracting-out relationships concerning the provision of public services, 
the type of controls (i.e. market-, hierarchy- and trust-based) put in place will be associated 
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with different relationship characteristics (namely, political visibility, delivery mode/goal 
congruence, partner knowledge).  
 
Table 1 summarises the expected associations between relationship characteristics and 
types of control.  
Insert Table 1  
 
Methods 
In order to carry out the research we conducted a survey for all Italian municipalities (510) 
of at least 20.000 inhabitants. We developed aquestionnaire, which was administered to the 
Chief Executive Officers (see Appendix 2, available online, data refer to 2008). The 
questionnaire was articulated in two sections: one dedicated to solid waste collection and 
the other to homecare services for elderly. These services were chosen in order to ensure 
diversity in the variables under consideration (Brown and Potoski 2003)2. We obtained a 
total of 91 responses3, where 46% referred to solid waste collection and 54% to homecare 
for elderly.  
To explore the proposed associations, we ran three separate linear regressions where 
against each type of control mechanism (market-based, hierarchy-based, trust-based), we 
regressed the independent variables previously discussed. The market-based pattern was 
measured adjusting Abernethy and Brownell’s (1997) scale of output control (Crombach 
alpha 55%). The hierarchy-based pattern drew on Abernethy and Brownell’s (1997) scales 
  
2 The governance of the elderly homecare services is overall more market-oriented than waste collection, as 96% of the 
providers are non-profit entities. 
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of behavioural and accounting control. These items have been adjusted to take into 
consideration the extent of supervision over performed activities (Crombach alpha 76%). 
Finally, Carson et al.’s (2006) scale was used for trust-based control (Crombach alpha 
79.6%). 
The independent variables are presented in Table 1, which specifies relevant literature, 
measures and scales used, together with their Crombach alpha for this study. It also shows 
the expected associations with the three types of controls (market-, hierarchy- and trust-
based). In addition to service and relationship characteristics, we controlled for the 
geographical area (the North-South divide often being seen as relevant in Italian settings – 
Anessi Pessina et al. 2008), the municipality’s (in terms of population) and provider’s (in 
terms of turnover) size, and the municipality’s financial performance and political 
orientation.  
The specification of the above model, including the regressors presented, is as follows: 
Type of control=α+β1 Asset specificity+β2 Task uncertainty+β3 Task interdependence+β4 
Output measurability+β5 Political visibilityi+β6 Delivery mode/goal congruencei+β7 Old 
contract length+β8Turnover+β9Political orientationi+β9 Population +β10 Geographical areai 
+β11 Surplus/deficit +ɛ 
 
Appendix 1 shows the correlation table for dependent and independent variables. 
 
Findings 
Control patterns 
  
3 In order to account for a non-response bias, we ran a two-sample t-test, using late respondents as surrogates for non-
respondents (Wallace and Mellor, 1988). The difference across responses was not statistically significant.  
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Considering the descriptive statistics presented in Table 2, control patterns’ mix and 
minimum and maximum scores relative to the three control types suggest that the trust-
based mechanisms are the most present, followed by hierarchy- and market-based ones. 
Looking across services, while trust controls are still predominant (Table 3), hierarchy-
based controls are more present than market-based ones in the elderly homecare; vice-versa 
for waste collection.  
Insert Tables 2 and 3  
 
Service and relationship characteristics 
In order to explore the variables associated with the different types of control (i.e. market-, 
hierarchy- and trust-based), three separate sets of linear regressions were performed (Tables  
5, 6 and 7). As expected, the significance of the explanatory variables varies with the type 
of control adopted. Proposition 1 appears to hold for hierarchical and market-based patterns 
of control, but not for trust-based ones (Table 4). Interestingly, service characteristics 
appear to be significantly associated with the two former types of control, but not with the 
latter. Proposition 2, on the contrary, does not seem generally supported by our study, 
suggesting that relationship characteristics would tend not to be significantly associated 
with the type of control chosen (Table 4). Only political visibility appears to be 
significantly (at 1%) related to market-based controls.  
 
Insert Table 4  
 
Explaining control mechanisms in contracting-out 
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Looking more closely at the explanatory variables, market-based mechanisms are positively 
associated with political visibility (also representing the different types of services) and 
output measurability (both significant at 1%), while negatively related to task uncertainty 
(at 5% significance). Output measurability and task uncertainty are aligned with the 
prediction of the broader contracting-out and inter-organizational literatures. With respect 
to political visibility, the data show that waste collection services, which are the most 
visible to citizens, foster market-type controls. On the other hand, elderly homecare, 
although being characterized by governance systems based on the market, tends to display 
fewer market-control mechanisms. This finding contradicts our expectations and previous 
studies (Lioukas et al. 1993; Cristofoli et al. 2010).      
Hierarchy-based mechanisms are more clearly explained by the identified variables, with an 
R2 of 54.37% defined by the significant (positive) association with asset specificity (10%) 
and output measurability (1%), and the negative relationship with the municipality’s 
financial performance (significant at 5%). These results are consistent with previous 
literature. A better organizational financial performance provides the basis for lower 
hierarchical control, thus less centralization and focus on processes (rather than final 
results) are required. It is also worth noting that service political visibility does not 
contribute to an explanation regarding the adoption of hierarchy-based controls.  
Interestingly, trust-based controls do not seem to be explained by any of the variables that 
the traditional contracting-out and inter-organizational control literatures would propose. 
This suggests that while market and hierarchical controls can be better explained by service 
features, trust-based control patterns in the public sector may be more strongly influenced 
by the informality of the political processes and the role that these play in the decisions 
around the provision of public services.  
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Finally, it is important to highlight that, contrary to expectations, the delivery mode/goal 
congruence (i.e. the fact that a private for-profit company is the provider) does not seem to 
influence the final choice of control mechanism. Similarly, geographical position (which 
strongly differentiates the economic and social background in Italy), municipality’s 
political orientation, size of the municipality and of the provider, all do not seem to 
influence the choice of controls. 
Insert Tables 5 to 7 
    
Control mechanisms and explanatory variables: an interpretation 
The findings suggest that it is not only important to consider the intensity of controls (as a 
limited number of studies had previously done), but also to distinguish across the types of 
controls that can be put in place. The analysis highlights that, in contracting-out 
relationships, market, hierarchy and trust controls display different intensities, can coexist 
and are explained by different variables.  
The high score of trust-based mechanisms and the difficulty in explaining them may 
suggest that these controls are pervasive within public organizations and are strictly 
interwoven with the public nature of the services themselves. The strong presence of trust-
based patterns entices two alternative explanations. On the one hand, very advanced or 
idiosyncratic configurations of relational/trust-based controls might be adopted, which are 
not fully explained by the variables suggested by the existing literature. On the other hand, 
“informal” channels of communication might be used to compensate for the lack of 
alternative monitoring tools. These dimensions are rarely captured by the variables 
traditionally used in the main literature and in research utilizing surveys and questionnaires. 
As a consequence, different factors, such as the presence of social or informal networks and 
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the use of fiduciary appointments, may come into play. Trust probably provides the 
background against which other control choices are taken.  
Our statistical model has its better predictive performance in the presence of hierarchy-
based controls, where, consistent with literature expectations, output measurability, asset 
specificity and financial performance prove relevant in explaining the choice of such 
mechanisms. However, delivery mode/goal congruence (Marvel and Marvel 2007, 2008; 
Hefetz and Warner 2012) and political visibility (Lioukas et al. 1993; Cristofoli et al. 2010) 
do not provide significant results. This is probably because hierarchical controls are those 
traditionally more established in the public sector (in our study, second only to trust-based 
ones), and, as a consequence, such mechanisms are always present in contracting-out 
relationships regardless of the type of service involved, its visibility and the nature of the 
provider (i.e. the delivery mode). The preference for hierarchical mechanisms is probably 
further strengthened by the traditional bureaucratic culture of the country under analysis, 
where the accomplishment of predefined rules is considered as the achievement of the 
result itself (Cristofoli et al. 2010). It is interesting to note that, despite recent calls for an 
increased attention towards political and contextual factors influencing public service 
management (Pollitt 2013; Cristofoli et al. 2010), we find that both political visibility and 
the contextual variables used as controls are not generally significant in explaining the 
choice between the two main mechanisms (trust and hierarchy-based controls).  
The adoption of more recent market-based controls does not appear to replace hierarchical 
or trust-based ones. On the contrary, once trust and hierarchical bases have been laid, the 
results suggest that market controls also play a role, and selective choices are made when 
these mechanisms are deemed useful. They are associated with political visibility of the 
service (Lioukas et al. 1993; Cristofoli et al. 2010), its output measurability and task 
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uncertainty (Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman 2000; Langfield-Smith and Smith 
2003; Håkansson and Lind 2004). This is in line with previous literature suggesting that the 
nature of the service itself matters in controlling and monitoring choices (Van Slyke 2007; 
Marvel and Marvel 2008).  
In the presence of market-based control mechanisms, the type of service and its visibility 
are important not only to define the intensity of controls (as suggested by previous 
literature), but also the type of control exerted. This could have a twofold explanation. First, 
as a consequence of the managerial reforms that took place over the last two decades in the 
public sector, a greater emphasis has been put on the communication of results and output 
as a means of providing legitimation for public sector activities. Second, more politically 
visible services (such as waste collection) might require tighter overall controls because of 
their greater importance. This leads to a triangulation of different mechanisms (in addition 
to the more common trust- and hierarchy-based ones) to monitor the service and its 
provider. In short, trust-, hierarchy- and market-based mechanisms represent “layers” of 
control, which, far from being mutually exclusive, tend to complement each other, perhaps 
mirroring the development of control systems in the wider public sector. This coexistence 
might reflect, on the one hand, the current state of the art of control mechanisms in the 
public sector, which could be considered as still evolving. Furthermore, it could also be the 
consequence of the “liability of newness” of the mechanisms themselves, where decision 
makers tend to stick to the practices they know better, adding new types of controls when 
necessary.   
Overall, the scant relevance of a number of variables proposed by the extant literature 
could be explained by the limited consideration that municipalities and/or their units have 
given to public-service providers’ monitoring and control devices so far. This attitude 
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might bring about a relative weakness in control systems’ design, which, in turn, may also 
account for the low variance across the different delivery modes (majority of non-profits in 
elderly homecare, majority of public-sector providers in waste collection). This 
interpretation is consistent with Van Slyke’s (2007) finding of a lack of monitoring 
variation in social-service providers, accompanied by a general underdevelopment of the 
systems.  
The above findings also confirm the importance of looking not only at the governance 
modes, but also at the control practices adopted in contracting-out relationships. A paradox 
seems to emerge where, although the governance structure of the elderly homecare sector is 
market-oriented and based on accreditation systems (relying on the externalisation of the 
service to private non-profit providers in the majority of the cases), market-based controls 
are significantly more present for waste collection (in the provision of which public-owned 
organizations are instead more often involved). This confirms that market-based controls 
are not necessarily tied to the mode of governance adopted, and therefore control practices 
can be of a different nature to the organizational forms chosen for public-service provision 
(Spekle 2001; Caglio and Ditillo 2008a).  
 
Conclusions 
Public-service contracting-out has often been accompanied by a strong academic focus on 
the emergence of new governance forms, and a major neglect of the processes and practices 
through which these contracted-out services are controlled and monitored. Trying to fill this 
gap, this paper explored the mechanisms set in place to control the provision of different 
public services at the municipal level. In particular, bringing together variables so far 
investigated separately in the inter-organizational control and contracting-out literatures, we 
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explored whether the variables traditionally used in these studies have explanatory potential 
with reference to control choices of contracted-out services.  
We find that service characteristics are more effective in explaining market- and hierarchy-
based mechanisms than relationship characteristics. Moreover, trust-, hierarchy- and 
market-based mechanisms seem to require different explanatory models. Trust-based 
controls, in particular, are the most widespread, but cannot be explained by the contracting-
out and inter-organizational variables traditionally used. This finding calls for further 
investigation of both the types of trust-based controls in use and the effectiveness of these 
monitoring systems. It is of note that market-based controls are not necessarily tied to the 
form of governance adopted. Finally, different from expectations (Marvel and Marvel 2007, 
2008), mode of delivery and goal congruence do not appear to influence significantly the 
type of control adopted.  
This paper’s contribution is twofold. First, we assessed the explanatory potential of 
transaction-cost variables with reference to control choices, rather than to contracting-out 
choices as most of the literature had done before. Second, while the little literature on the 
control of contracted-out public services has mostly focused on the intensity of the controls 
put in place, we also took into consideration their type (hierarchy, market and trust), 
integrating the contracting-out with inter-organizational control literatures and showing that 
not all variables are relevant in contracting-out relationships.  
The study calls for further research on services with different characteristics. The 
importance of trust-based controls and the difficulty in explaining their adoption with 
respect to traditional variables (mainly drawn on economic and control studies) suggest that 
additional studies are needed to explore the role of other variables, such as political and 
informal factors, in defining the type and the intensity of the controls used between the 
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public sector and public-service providers. The findings highlight the importance of 
distinguishing between the three different types of control, as market and hierarchical 
mechanisms appear more influenced by variables linked to managerial rationality, while 
trust-based ones might relate more to expressions of political rationality. Future studies 
might devote more attention towards the political and contextual factors affecting public-
service management (Pollitt 2013)4, which cannot simply be grasped through quantitative 
analysis. Understanding the dynamics and complexities of contracting-out requires the 
accumulation of knowledge through a combination of multidisciplinary and theoretical 
approaches, as well as mixed methods of analysis. Consistent with this view, while we 
conducted a survey, studying informal processes of control might require more participative 
research methods, such as interviews, direct observations and ethnographic studies.  
From a managerial perspective, our results suggest that public managers need to be aware 
of the different types of controls available, and that they should consider the 
appropriateness of the controls used in managing relationships with the service providers, 
taking into consideration both service and relationship characteristics. The current 
pervasiveness of trust-based mechanisms also points to the need for the development of 
managerial competences and skills, such as communication, negotiation and networking, 
together with the strengthening of transparency mechanisms in place between the public 
sector and service providers. From a policy perspective, policy makers often tend to focus 
on the design of public-service governance modes, neglecting the related control 
mechanisms. This paper also highlights the necessity for regulators to place more emphasis 
on encouraging the development of monitoring systems for public services, especially for 
those contracted-out. In doing so, they should adopt an integrated and holistic view of the 
  
4 We are indebted to one of the reviewers for this further perspective.  
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possible control systems and pay particular attention to trust-based mechanisms, where, the 
danger exists, that, in pursuing a desire for informality, possible threats to public 
accountability are obscured. Moreover, they should avoid the usual “one-fits-all” approach, 
as the intensity and types of control should reflect the features of the services involved. 
Finally, they should be aware that governance modes adopted and the relative control 
mechanisms do not necessarily coincide or align, hence the need to choose appropriate 
control mechanisms and go beyond the selection of packaged stereotypes.  
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Tables 
Table 1 – Independent variables: literature, measures, expectations 
Independent variables References Measures Expectations 
Market- based Hierarchy-
based 
Trust-based 
Service characteristics 
Asset specificity Ferris and Graddy (1991) 
Van der Meer-Kooistra and 
Vosselman (2000) 
Milward and Provan (2000) 
Brown and Potoski (2003) 
Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003) 
Håkansson and Lind (2004) 
Caglio and Ditillo (2008a, 2008b) 
Fernandez’s (2007) Likert 
scale, measuring the extent to 
which the investments made to 
support a particular 
transaction have a higher value 
to that transaction than they 
would have if they were 
redeployed for any other 
purpose.  
 
Crombach alpha 60%  
Low Moderate High 
Task uncertainty Ferris and Graddy (1991) 
Van der Meer-Kooistra and 
Vosselman (2000) 
Milward and Provan (2000) 
Brown and Potoski (2003) 
Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003) 
Håkansson and Lind (2004) 
Caglio and Ditillo (2008a, 2008b) 
Abernethy and Brownell’s (1997) 
scale, used to measure, in 
five-point fully anchored form, 
the level of task analysability 
that may derive from the 
execution of the task5.  
 
Crombach alpha 81.2% 
Low Moderate High 
Task interdependence Ferris and Graddy (1991) 
Van der Meer-Kooistra and 
Vosselman (2000) 
Milward and Provan (2000) 
Brown and Potoski (2003) 
Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003) 
Håkansson and Lind (2004) 
Caglio and Ditillo (2008a, 2008b) 
Ben Bensaou and Venkat 
Venkatraman (1995)’s scale. 
Respondents were asked to 
indicate on a 5-item scale the 
extent to which the service 
providers rely on the 
municipality to start, progress 
and complete their activities. 
 
Crombach alpha 75.2% 
Low Moderate High 
Output measurability Ferris and Graddy (1991) 
Van der Meer-Kooistra and 
Vosselman (2000) 
Milward and Provan (2000) 
Brown and Potoski (2003) 
Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003) 
Håkansson and Lind (2004) 
Caglio and Ditillo (2008a, 2008b) 
Trevor Brown and Matthew 
Potoski (2005)’ s scale, using 
a five-point fully anchored 
instrument to measure the 
measurability of outputs. 
 
Crombach alpha 78.6% 
 
High Low Low 
Relationship characteristics 
 
Political visibility Lioukas et al (1993)  
Cristofoli et al (2011) 
As a proxy for political 
visibility we used the number 
Low Moderate High 
  
5 Summed scores for the set of items loading on each factor were used as opposed to factor scores, because of the conventional caution on the instability of factor loading solutions. 
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Hefetz and Warner (2012) 
 
of final users for the 
services, higher for waste 
collection (pol_vis=1) and 
lower for homecare services 
pol_vis=0). 
Delivery mode/ goal 
congruence   
Provan and Milward (1995)  
Van Slyke (2007) 
Marvel and Marvel (2007, 2008)  
Drawing on Marvel and Marvel 
(2007, 2008) the delivery mode 
was defined in terms of the 
main dichotomy in provider’s 
ownership, distinguishing 
across private for-profit 
(delivery mode/goal_congr=1) 
vs. non-profit entities (both 
public and private, delivery 
mode/goal_congr=0). 
No expectation No 
expectation 
No 
expectation 
Partner knowledge   Cristofoli et al (2011) Length of previous contract 
(days) 
Low Moderate High 
Controls 
Provider’s size  Provider’s turnover (thousands 
of Euros) 
No expectation No 
expectation 
No 
expectation 
Political orientation Hefetz and Warner (2012) 
Albalate et al. (2013) 
 
Municipality’s council 
political orientation in 2008: 
Centre-right (0) 
Centre-left (1) 
No expectation No 
expectation 
No 
expectation 
Municipality’s size Albalate et al. (2013) (ln)population size No expectation No 
expectation 
No 
expectation 
Geographical position 
 
Hefetz and Warner (2012) 
 
North-centre (1) 
South-centre (0) 
No expectation No 
expectation 
No 
expectation 
Financial performance 
 
Hefetz and Warner (2012) 
 
municipality’s surplus/deficit 
(thousands of Euros) 
No expectation No 
expectation 
No 
expectation 
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Table 2 –Descriptive statistics 
 Variable      |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
Market     |        87    2.258621    .7824623          1          4 
Hierarchy      |        91     3.09652    .6681766   1.333333        4.5 
Trust       |        90    3.693915    .5279828   2.142857   4.857143 
Turnover    |        62    2.01e+08    9.04e+08      84162   6.09e+09 
Political      | 
visibility  |        91    .4615385    .5012804          0          1 
Asset          | 
specificity    |        91    3.045788    .5098208   1.333333        4.5 
Output         | 
measurability  |        91    3.586264    .5877011          2        4.8 
Task           | 
uncertainty    |        91    3.635531    .4248242   2.555556   4.666667 
Task           | 
interdependence|        91    3.142857    .7406085          1   4.666667 
Population(ln) |        91    11.47022    .8946997   9.939674   14.07759 
Old contract   | 
length         |        79    68.56962    109.6675          3        624 
Political      | 
orientation    |        91    .6153846    .4891996          0          1 
Geographical   | 
area           |        91    .5714286    .4976134          0          1 
Surplus/deficit|        91    2.14e+07    6.99e+07   -4778352   4.64e+08 
Delivery mode/ |        84    2.190476    .8981399          1          3 
goal congruence|    
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Table 3 - Descriptive statistics by service  
 Elderly Homecare|       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
Market           |        46    2.148551    .7405606          1          4 
Hierarchy        |        49     3.22551     .605789   1.333333   4.333333 
Trust            |        48    3.705853    .5612804   2.142857   4.857143 
Turnover         |        32    1.39e+07    2.35e+07      84162   7.00e+07 
Asset specificity|        49    2.965986    .5057306   1.333333          4 
Output           | 
measurability    |        49     3.75102    .4787668        2.2        4.8 
Task uncertainty |        49    3.547052      .38669   2.555556   4.222222 
Task             | 
interdependence  |        49    3.278912    .7211967          1   4.666667 
Population(ln)   |        49      11.473    .8868626   9.939674   14.07759 
Old contract     | 
length           |        45    26.97778    16.66036          3         60 
Political        | 
orientation      |        49    .6122449    .4922875          0          1 
Geographical area|        49    .5918367     .496587          0          1 
Surplus/deficit  |        49    2.01e+07    6.78e+07   -4778352   4.64e+08 
Delivery mode/   |        45    2.911111    .4168182          1          3 
goal congruence  | 
 
Waste collection |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
Market           |        41    2.382114    .8184028          1          4 
Hierarchy        |        42    2.946032    .7122601   1.333333        4.5 
Trust            |        42    3.680272    .4935887   2.428571   4.714286 
Turnover         |        30    4.00e+08    1.28e+09     930262   6.09e+09 
Asset specificity|        42    3.138889    .5046084   1.666667        4.5 
Output           | 
measurability    |        42    3.394048    .6477166          2        4.6 
Task uncertainty |        42    3.738757    .4481472   2.666667   4.666667 
Task             | 
interdependence  |        42    2.984127    .7397076   1.333333   4.666667 
Population(ln)   |        42    11.46697    .9145149   9.939674   14.07759 
Old contract     | 
length           |        34    123.6176    150.2539          6        624 
Political        | 
Orientation      |        42    .6190476    .4915074          0          1 
Geographical area|        42     .547619    .5037605          0          1 
Surplus/deficit  |        42    2.30e+07    7.31e+07   -4778352   4.64e+08 
Delivery mode/   |        39    1.358974    .4859705          1          2 
goal congruence  | 
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Table 4 –Findings: expected and actual associations 
 Type of control/Dependent 
variable 
Market- based Hierarchy-based Trust-based 
Independent variables Expected 
sign 
Findings Expected 
sign 
Findings Expected 
sign 
Findings 
Service characteristics 
Proposition 
1 
Asset specificity Low - Moderate Confirmed High - 
Task uncertainty Low Confirmed Moderate - High - 
Task interdependence Low - Moderate - High - 
Output measurability High Confirmed Low Confirmed Low - 
Relationship characteristics 
Proposition 
2 
Political visibility Low High 
(Contradicted) 
Moderate - High - 
Delivery mode/ goal congruence No 
expectation 
- No 
expectation 
- No 
expectation 
- 
Partner knowledge Low - Moderate - High - 
Controls 
 Provider’s size No 
expectation 
- No 
expectation 
- No 
expectation 
- 
Political orientation No 
expectation 
- No 
expectation 
- No 
expectation 
- 
Municipality’s size No 
expectation 
- No 
expectation 
- No 
expectation 
- 
Geographical position 
 
No 
expectation 
- No 
expectation 
- No 
expectation 
- 
Financial performance 
 
No 
expectation 
- No 
expectation 
High No 
expectation 
- 
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Table 5 - Regression results for market-based control 
 
    Source  |      SS       df       MS               Number of obs =      51 
-------------------------------------------           F( 12,    38) =    1.87 
       Model |  10.5925477    12   .88271231          Prob > F      =  0.0701 
    Residual |  17.8911126    38  .470818753          R-squared     =  0.3719 
-------------------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1735 
       Total |  28.4836603    50  .569673206          Root MSE      =  .68616 
 
 
Market                |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
Turnover              |  -7.81e-11   2.00e-10    -0.39   0.698    -4.83e-10    3.26e-10 
Political             | 
visibility (1)        |   .9077998   .3139598     2.89   0.006     .2722214    1.543378 
Asset specificity     |  -.1217351    .191822    -0.63   0.529    -.5100585    .2665883 
Output measurability  |   .8294338   .2297293     3.61   0.001     .3643711    1.294497 
Task uncertainty      |  -.5577926   .2706411    -2.06   0.046    -1.105677   -.0099083 
Task interdependence  |  -.0744968   .1559565    -0.48   0.636    -.3902142    .2412205 
Population(ln)        |   .0353652   .1408685     0.25   0.803    -.2498082    .3205386 
Old contract length   |  -.0008338    .001422    -0.59   0.561    -.0037125    .0020449 
Political             | 
orientation (1)       |  -.2130474    .271713    -0.78   0.438    -.7631016    .3370068 
Geographical area (1) |   .0086965   .2768335     0.03   0.975    -.5517236    .5691165 
Surplus/deficit       |  -2.63e-09   1.82e-09    -1.44   0.157    -6.33e-09    1.06e-09 
Delivery mode/        |  -.5588987   .4039567    -1.38   0.175    -1.376666    .2588688 
goal congruence (1)   | 
_cons                 |   1.262319   1.983928     0.64   0.528    -2.753933     5.27857 
 
 
 
Table 6 - Regression results for hierarchy-based control 
  Source    |    SS       df       MS               Number of obs =      52 
-------------------------------------------        F( 12,    39) =    3.87 
       Model |  12.5171545    12   1.0430962       Prob > F      =  0.0006 
    Residual |  10.5062656    39  .269391426       R-squared     =  0.5437 
-------------------------------------------        Adj R-squared =  0.4033 
       Total |  23.0234201    51  .451439609       Root MSE      =  .51903 
 
 
Hierarchy             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
Turnover              |  -1.83e-10   1.50e-10    -1.22   0.231    -4.87e-10    1.21e-10 
Political             | 
visibility (1)        |  -.0962652   .2356317    -0.41   0.685    -.5728753    .3803448 
Asset specificity     |   .2578674   .1426553     1.81   0.078    -.0306801    .5464149 
Output measurability  |   .8085447   .1730135     4.67   0.000      .458592    1.158498 
Task uncertainty      |  -.2529798   .2045268    -1.24   0.224    -.6666742    .1607147 
Task interdependence  |    .045219   .1142439     0.40   0.694     -.185861    .2762991 
Population(ln)        |   .1748687   .1049856     1.67   0.104    -.0374847     .387222 
Old contract length   |   .0003596   .0010756     0.33   0.740    -.0018159    .0025351 
Political             | 
orientation (1)       |  -.0103947   .1997981    -0.05   0.959    -.4145244    .3937351 
Geographical area (1) |   .3260648   .1993199     1.64   0.110    -.0770977    .7292274 
Surplus/deficit       |  -2.82e-09   1.36e-09    -2.07   0.045    -5.58e-09   -5.97e-11 
Delivery mode/        |   .2248121   .3051717     0.74   0.466     -.392456    .8420801 
goal congruence (1)   | 
_cons                 |   -1.97291    1.47505    -1.34   0.189    -4.956481    1.010661 
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Table 7 – Regression results for trust-based control 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS             Number of obs =      52 
-------------------------------------------           F( 12,    39) =    0.57 
       Model |  1.88783483    12  .157319569          Prob > F      =  0.8537 
    Residual |   10.794661    39  .276786181          R-squared     =  0.1489 
-------------------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.1130 
       Total |  12.6824959    51   .24867639          Root MSE      =   .5261 
 
 
Trust                 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
Turnover              |   6.40e-11   1.52e-10     0.42   0.677    -2.44e-10    3.72e-10 
Political             | 
visibility (1)        |  -.0178381   .2388438    -0.07   0.941    -.5009453    .4652691 
Asset specificity     |   .1462505   .1445999     1.01   0.318    -.1462304    .4387315 
Output measurability  |   .0203358    .175372     0.12   0.908    -.3343875    .3750591 
Task uncertainty      |  -.0527861   .2073149    -0.25   0.800    -.4721201    .3665478 
Task interdependence  |  -.0281508   .1158013    -0.24   0.809     -.262381    .2060794 
Population(ln)        |   .0316492   .1064167     0.30   0.768    -.1835989    .2468973 
Old contract length   |   .0008672   .0010902     0.80   0.431     -.001338    .0030724 
Political orientation |  -.1748368   .2025217    -0.86   0.393    -.5844756    .2348021 
Geographical area (1) |  -.0552689    .202037    -0.27   0.786    -.4639274    .3533895 
Surplus/deficit       |  -2.28e-09   1.38e-09    -1.65   0.107    -5.07e-09    5.19e-10 
Delivery mode/        |  -.1236682   .3093318    -0.40   0.691    -.7493508    .5020145 
goal congruence (1)   | 
_cons                 |   3.247743   1.495158     2.17   0.036     .2234999    6.2719 
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Appendix 1 
Correlation table 
 
               | Trust Market Hierarchy Turnover Pol.vis. Asset sp. Output meas. Task int. Task unc. Pop. Old contract Pol.Orient. Geo.area Surpl/def Del.mode 
Trust          |  1.0000  
Market         | -0.0013 1.0000  
Hierarchy      |  0.2129  0.3324  1.0000  
Turnover       | -0.0028  0.0365  0.0298   1.0000  
Political      | 
visibility     |  -0.0243  0.1499  -0.2097  0.2155   1.0000  
Asset          | 
specificity    |   0.1752  0.0896  0.2020   0.0569   0.1700   1.0000  
Output         | 
measurability  |   0.0319  0.2159  0.4434   0.0907  -0.3045  -0.0387   1.0000  
Task           | 
interdependence|   0.0118  0.0851  0.1765  -0.0051  -0.1995   0.0217   0.1675    1.0000 
Task           | 
uncertainty    |   0.1083  -0.0354 0.1705   0.1469   0.2262   0.0843   0.1312    0.1770    1.0000 
Population(ln) |  -0.1302  -0.0595 -0.0151  0.1650  -0.0034   0.0729  -0.0846    -0.0591   -0.0828  1.0000   
Old contract   | 
length         |   0.0076  0.0546  -0.0881  -0.0146  0.4391   0.1342  -0.1897    -0.1924   0.1625   -0.0062  1.0000 
Political      | 
orientation    |   0.2067  0.0089  0.1715   0.1641   0.0070   0.1605   0.0355    -0.0307   -0.0404  -0.0638  -0.0755  1.0000 
Geographical   | 
area           |   0.0546  -0.1857 0.1503   0.1545  -0.0445   0.0198  -0.0413    -0.1637   0.1179    0.2169  0.2602   0.3651    1.0000   
Surplus/deficit|  -0.2038  -0.1103 -0.1827  0.0143   0.0209   0.0307  -0.0686    -0.2577   -0.2346   0.5293  -0.0679  -0.1779   0.0667    1.0000   
Delivery mode  |  -0.0839  -0.1004  0.2568  -0.2572  -0.8671  -0.2433 0.3254     0.2539    -0.2082  -0.0391  -0.5224  -0.0798   -0.1116   -0.0494   1.0000 
 
